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Why have asset price properties changed so little
in 200 years
Jean-Philippe Bouchaud and Damien Challet
Abstract We first review empirical evidence that asset prices have had episodes
of large fluctuations and been inefficient for at least 200 years. We briefly review
recent theoretical results as well as the neurological basis of trend following and
finally argue that these asset price properties can be attributed to two fundamental
mechanisms that have not changed for many centuries: an innate preference for trend
following and the collective tendency to exploit as much as possible detectable price
arbitrage, which leads to destabilizing feedback loops.
1 Introduction
According to mainstream economics, financial markets should be both efficient and
stable. Efficiency means that the current asset price is an unbiased estimator of its
fundamental value (aka “right”, “fair” or “true”) price. As a consequence, no trad-
ing strategy may yield statistically abnormal profits based on public information.
Stability implies that all price jumps can only be due to external news.
Real-world price returns have surprisingly regular properties, in particular fat-
tailed price returns and lasting high- and low- volatility periods. The question is
therefore how to conciliate these statistical properties, both non-trivial and univer-
sally observed across markets and centuries, with the efficient market hypothesis.
The alternative hypothesis is that financial markets are intrinsically and chroni-
cally unstable. Accordingly, the interactions between traders and prices inevitably
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lead to price biases, speculative bubbles and instabilities that originate from feed-
back loops. This would go a long way in explaining market crises, both fast (liquid-
ity crises, flash crashes) and slow (bubbles and trust crises). This would also explain
why crashes did not wait for the advent of modern HFT to occur: whereas the May
6 2010 flash crash is well known, the one of May 28 1962, of comparable intensity
but with only human traders, is much less known.
The debate about the real nature of financial market is of fundamental impor-
tance. As recalled above, efficient markets provide prices that are unbiased, infor-
mative estimators of the value of assets. The efficient market hypothesis is not only
intellectually enticing, but also very reassuring for individual investors, who can buy
stock shares without risking being outsmarted by more savvy investors.
This contribution starts by reviewing 200 years of stylized facts and price pre-
dictability. Then, gathering evidence from Experimental Psychology, Neuroscience
and agent-based modelling, it outlines a coherent picture of the basic and persis-
tent mechanisms at play in financial markets, which are at the root of destabilizing
feedback loops.
2 Market anomalies
Among the many asset price anomalies documented in the economic literature since
the 1980s (Schwert [2003]), two of them stand out:
1. The Momentum Puzzle: price returns are persistent, i.e., past positive (negative)
returns predict future positive (negative) returns.
2. The Excess Volatility Puzzle: asset price volatility is much larger than that of
fundamental quantities
These two effects are not compatible with the efficient market hypothesis and sug-
gest that financial market dynamics is influenced by other factors than fundamental
quantities. Other puzzles, such as the “low-volatility” and “quality” anomalies, are
also very striking, but we will not discuss them here – see Ang et al. [2009], Baker
et al. [2011], Ciliberti et al. [2016], Bouchaud et al. [2016] for recent reviews.
2.1 Trends and bubbles
In blatant contradiction with the efficient market hypothesis, trend-following strate-
gies have been successful on all asset classes for a very long time. Figure 1 shows
for example a backtest of such strategy since 1800 (Lempe´rie`re et al. [2014]). The
regularity of its returns over 200 years implies the presence of a permanent mecha-
nism that makes price returns persistent.
Indeed, the propensity to follow past trends is a universal effect, which most
likely originates from a behavioural bias: when faced with an uncertain outcome,
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Fig. 1 Aggregate performance of all sectors of a trend-following strategy with the trend computed
over the last six-month moving window, from year 1800 to 2013. T-statistics of excess returns is
9.8. From Lempe´rie`re et al. [2014]. Note that the performance in the last 2 years since that study
(2014-2015) has been strongly positive.
one is tempted to reuse a simple strategy that seemed to be successful in the past
(Gigerenzer and Goldstein [1996]). The relevance of behavioural biases to financial
dynamics, discussed by many authors, among whom Kahneman and Shiller, has
been confirmed in many experiments on artificial markets (Smith et al. [1988]),
surverys (Shiller [2000], Menkhoff [2011], Greenwood and Shleifer [2013]), etc.
which we summarize in Section 3.
Fig. 2 Evolution of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average index and its volatility over a century. See
Zumbach and Finger [2010].
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Fig. 3 Yearly evolution of the probability of the occurence of 10-σ price jump for a given day
for assets in the S&P500 since 1991. Yellow bars: positive jumps; green bars: negative jumps; red
bars: both of them. These probabilities do vary statistically from year to year, but far less than the
volatility itself. This suggests that probability distributions of returns, normalized by their volatility,
is universal, even in the tails (cf. also Fig. 2). Note that the jumps probability has not increased since
1991, despite the emergence of High Frequency Trading (source: Stefano Ciliberti).
2.2 Short-term price dynamics: jumps and endogenous dynamics
2.2.1 Jump statistics
Figure 4 shows the empirical price return distributions of assets from three totally
different assets classes. The distributions are remarkably similar (see also Zumbach
[2015]): the probability of extreme return are all P(x)∼ |x|−1−µ , where the exponent
µ is close to 3 (Stanley et al. [2008]). The same law holds for other markets (raw
materials, currencies, interest rates). This implies that crises of all sizes occur and
result into both positive and negative jumps, from fairly small crises to centennial
crises.
In addition, and quite remarkably, the probability of the occurence of price jumps
is much more stable than volatility (see also Zumbach and Finger [2010]). Figure 3
illustrates this stability by plotting the 10-σ price jump probability as a function of
time.
2.2.2 The endogenous nature of price jumps
What causes these jumps? Far from being rare events, they are part of the daily
routine of markets: every day, at least one 5-σ event occurs for one of the S&P500
components! According the Efficient Market Hypothesis, only some very significant
pieces of information may cause large jumps, i.e., may substantially change the fun-
damental value of a given asset. This logical connection is disproved by empirical
studies which match news sources with price returns: only a small fraction of jumps
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Fig. 4 Daily price return distributions of price, at-the-money volatility and CDS of the 283 S& P
500 that have one, between 2010 and 2013. Once one normalizes the returns of each asset class
by their respective volatility, these three distributions are quite similar, despite the fact the asset
classes are very different. The dashed lines correspond to the “inverse cubic law” P(x) ∼ |x|−1−3
(source: Julius Bonart).
can be related to news and thus defined as an exogenous shock (Cutler et al. [1998],
Fair [2002], Joulin et al. [2008], Cornell [2013]).
The inevitable conclusion is that most price jumps are self-inflicted, i.e., are en-
dogenous. From a dynamical point of view, this means that feedback loops are so
important that, at times, the state of market dynamics is near critical: small pertur-
bations may cause very large price changes. Many different modelling frameworks
yield essentially the same conclusion (Wyart et al. [2008], Marsili et al. [2009],
Bacry et al. [2012], Hardiman et al. [2013], Chicheportiche and Bouchaud [2014]).
The relative importance of exogenous and endogenous shocks is then linked to
the propensity of the financial markets to hover near critical or unstable points. The
next step is therefore to find mechanisms that systematically tend to bring financial
markets on the brink.
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3 Fundamental market mechanisms: arbitrage, behavioural
biases and feedback loops
In short, we argue below that greed and learning are two sufficient ingredients to
explain the above stylized facts. There is no doubt that human traders have always
tried to outsmart each other, and that the members the homo sapiens sapiens clique
have some learning abilities. Computers and High Frequency Finance then merely
decrease the minimum reaction speed (Hardiman et al. [2013]) without modifying
much the essence of the mechanisms at play.
In order to properly understand the nature of the interaction between investors in
financial markets, one needs to keep two essential ingredients
1. Investor heterogeneity: the distribution of their wealth, trading frequency, com-
puting power, etc. have heavy tails, which prevents a representative agent ap-
proach.
2. Asynchronism: the number of trades per agent in a given period is heavy-tailed,
which implies that they do not trade synchronously. In addition, the continuous
double auction mechanism implies sequential trading: only two orders may in-
teract at any time.
One thus cannot assume that all the investors behave in the same way, nor that
they can be split into two or three categories, which is nevertheless a common as-
sumption when modelling or analyzing market behaviour.
3.1 Speculation
Although the majority of trades are of algorithmic nature nowadays, most traders
(human or artificial) use the same types of strategies. Algorithmic trading very often
simply implements analysis and extrapolation rules that have been used by human
traders since immemorial times, as they are deeply ingrained in human brains.
3.1.1 Trend following
Trend-following in essence consists in assuming that future price changes will be of
the same sign as last past price changes. It is well-known that this type of strategy
may destabilize prices by increasing the amplitude and duration of price excursions.
Bubbles also last longer because of heavy-tailed trader heterogeneity. Neglecting
new investors for the time being, the heavy-tailed nature of trader reaction times
implies that some traders are much slower than others to take part to a nascent
bubble. This causes a lasting positive volume imbalance that feeds a bubble for a
long time. Finally, a bubble attracts new investors that may be under the impression
that this bubble grow further. The neuronal processes that contribute the emergence
and duration of bubbles are discussed in section 3.4.2.
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3.1.2 Contrarian behaviour
Contrarian trading consists in betting on mean-reverting behavior: price excursions
are deemed to be only temporary, i.e., that the price will return to some reference
(“fundamental” or other) value. Given the heterogeneity of traders, one may assume
that the do not all have the same reference value in mind. The dynamical effects
of this type of strategies is to stabilize price (with respect to its perceived reference
value).
3.1.3 Mixing trend followers and contrarians
In many simplified agent-based models (De Grauwe et al. [1993], Brock and
Hommes [1998], Lux and Marchesi [1999]) both types of strategies are used by
some fractions of the trader populations. A given trader may either always use the
same kind of strategy (Frankel et al. [1986], Frankel and Froot [1990]), may switch
depending on some other process (Kirman [1991]) or on the recent trading perfor-
mance of the strategies (Brock and Hommes [1998], Wyart and Bouchaud [2007],
Lux and Marchesi [1999]). In a real market, the relative importance of a given type
of strategy is not constant, which influences the price dynamics.
Which type of trading strategy dominates can be measured in principle. Let us
denote the price volatility measured over a single time step by σ1. If trend following
dominates, the volatility of returns measured every T units of time, denoted by σT
will be larger than σ1
√
T . Conversely, if mean-reverting dominates, σT < σ1
√
T .
Variance-ratio tests, based on the quantity σT/(σ1
√
T ), are suitable tools to assess
the state of the market (see Charles and Darne´ [2009] for a review); see for example
the PUCK concept, proposed by Mizuno et al. [2007].
When trend following dominates, trends and bubbles may last for a long time.
The bursting of a bubble may be seen as mean-reversion taking (belatedly) over.
This view is too simplistic, however, as it implicitly assumes that all the traders have
the same calibration length and the same strategy parameters. In reality, the periods
of calibration used by traders to extrapolate price trends are very heterogeneous.
Thus, strategy heterogeneity and the fact that traders have to close their positions
some time imply that a more complex analysis is needed.
3.2 Empirical studies
In order to study the behaviour of individual investors, the financial literature makes
use of several types of data
1. Surveys about individual strategies and anticipation of the market return over the
coming year (Shiller [2000], Greenwood and Shleifer [2013]).
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2. The daily investment flows in US securities of the sub-population of individual
traders. The transactions of individual traders are labelled as such, without any
information about the identity of the investor (Kaniel et al. [2008]).
3. The daily net investment fluxes of each investor in a given market. For example,
Tumminello et al. [2012] use data about Nokia in the Finish stock exchange.
4. Transactions of all individual investors of a given broker (Dorn et al. [2008],
de Lachapelle and Challet [2010]). The representativity of such kind of data may
be however uestionned (cf. next item)
5. Transactions of all individual investors of all the brokers accessing a given mar-
ket. Jackson [2004] shows that the behaviour of individual investors is the same
provided that they use an on-line broker.
3.2.1 Trend follower vs contrarian
Many surveys show that institutional and individual investors expectation about fu-
ture market returns are trend-following (e.g. Greenwood and Shleifer [2013]), yet
the analysis of the individual investors’ trading flow at a given frequency (i.e. daily,
weekly, monthly) invariably point out that their actual trading is dominantly contrar-
ian as it is anti-correlated with previous price returns, while institutional trade flow
is mostly uncorrelated with recent price changes on average (Grinblatt and Kelo-
harju [2000], Jackson [2004], Dorn et al. [2008], Lillo et al. [2008], Challet and
de Lachapelle [2013]), . In addition, the style of trading of a given investor only
rarely changes (Lillo et al. [2008]).
Both findings are not as incompatible as it seems, because the latter behaviour
is consistent with price discount seeking. In this context, the contrarian nature of
investment flows means that individual investors prefer to buy shares of an asset
after a negative price return and to sell it after a positive price return, just to get a
better price for their deal. If they neglect their own impact, i.e., if the current price
is a good approximation of the realized transaction price, this makes sense. If their
impact is not negligible, then the traders buy when their expected transaction price
is smaller than the current price and conversely (Batista et al. [2015]).
3.2.2 Herding behaviour
Lakonishok et al. [1992] define a statistical test of global herding. US mutual funds
do not herd, while individual investors significantly do (Dorn et al. [2008]). Instead
of defining global herding, Tumminello et al. [2012] define sub-groups of invidivual
investors defined by the synchronization of their activity and inactivity, the rationale
being that people that use the same way to analyse information are likely to act in
the same fashion. This in fact defines herding at a much more microscopic level.
The persistent presence of many sub-groups sheds a new light on herding. Using
this method, Challet et al. [2016] show that synchronous sub-groups of institutional
investors also exist.
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3.2.3 Behavioural biases
Many behavioural biases have been reported in the literature. Whereas they are only
relevant to human investors, i.e. to individual investors, most institutional funds are
not (yet) fully automated and resort to human decisions. We will mention two of the
most relevant biases.
Human beings react different to gains and to losses (see e.g. Prospect Theory
Kahneman and Tversky [1979]) and prefer positively skewed returns to negatively
skewed returns (aka the “lottery ticket” effect, see Lemperiere et al. [2016]). This
has been linked to the disposition bias, which causes investors to close too early
winning trades and too late losing ones (Shefrin and Statman [1985], Odean [1998],
Boolell-Gunesh et al. [2009]) (see however Ranguelova [2001], Barberis and Xiong
[2009], Annaert et al. [2008]). An indisputable bias is overconfidence, which leads
to an excess of trading activity, which diminishes the net performance Barber and
Odean [2000], see also Batista et al. [2015] for a recent experiment eliciting this ef-
fect. This explains why male traders earn less than female trades Barber and Odean
[2001]. Excess confidence is also found in individual portfolios, which are not suffi-
ciently diversified. For example, individual traders trust too much their asset selec-
tion abilities (Goetzmann and Kumar [2005], Calvet et al. [2007]).
3.3 Learning and market instabilities
Financial markets force investors to be adaptive, even if they are not always aware
of it (Farmer [1999], Zhang [1999], Lo [2004]). Indeed, strategy selection operates
in two distinct ways
1. Implicit: assume that an investor always uses the same strategy and never recal-
ibrates its parameters. The performance of this strategy modulates the wealth of
the investor, hence its relative importance on markets. In the worst case, this in-
vestor and his strategy effectively disappears. This is the argument attributed to
Milton Friedman according to which only rational investors are able to survive
in the long run because the uninformed investors are weeded out.
2. Explicit: investors possess several strategies and use them in an adaptive way,
according to their recent success. In this case, strategies might die (i.e., not being
used), but investors may survive.
The neo-classical theory assumes the convergence of financial asset prices to-
wards an equilibrium in which prices are no longer predictable. The rationale is that
market participants are learning optimally such that this outcome is inevitable. A
major problem with this approach is that learning requires a strong enough signal-
to-noise ratio (Sharpe ratio); as the signal fades away, so does the efficiency of any
learning scheme. As a consequence, reaching a perfectly efficient market state is
impossible in finite time.
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This a major cause of market instability. Patzelt and Pawelzik [2011] showed that
optimal signal removal in presence of noise tends to converge to a critical state char-
acterized by explosive and intermittent fluctuations, which precisely correspond to
the stylized facts described in the first part of this paper. This is a completely generic
result and directly applies to financial markets. Signal-to-noise mediated transitions
to explosive volatility is found in agent-based models in which predictability is mea-
surable, as in the Minority Game (Challet and Marsili [2003], Challet et al. [2005])
and more sophisticated models (Giardina and Bouchaud [2003]).
3.4 Experiments
3.4.1 Artificial assets
In their famous work, Smith et al. [1988] found that price bubbles emerged in most
experimental sessions, even if only three or four agents were involved. This means
that financial bubble do not need very many investors to appear. Interestingly, the
more experienced the subjects, the less likely the emergence of a bubble.
More recently, Hommes et al. [2005] observed that in such experiments, the re-
sulting price converges towards the rational price either very rapidly or very slowly
or else with large oscillations. Anufriev and Hommes [2009] assume that the sub-
jects dynamically use very simple linear price extrapolation rules (among which
trend-following and mean-reverting rules),
3.4.2 Neurofinance
Neurofinance aims at studying the neuronal process involved in investment deci-
sions (see Lo [2011] for an excellent review). One of the most salient result is that,
expectedly, human beings spontaneously prefer to follow perceived past trends.
Various hormones play a central role in the dynamics of risk perception and re-
ward seeking, which are major sources of positive and negative feedback loops in
Finance. Even better, hormone secretion by the body modifies the strength of feed-
back loops dynamically, and feedback loops interact between themselves. Some
hormones have a feel-good effect, while other reinforce to risk aversion.
Coates and Herbert [2008] measured the cortisol (the “stress hormone”) con-
centration in saliva samples of real traders and found that it depends on the realized
volatility of their portfolio. This means that a high volatility period durable increases
the cortisol level of traders, which increases risk aversion and reduces activity and
liquidity of markets, to the detriment of markets as a whole.
Reward-seeking of male traders is regulated by testosterone. The first winning
round-trip leads to an increase of the level testosterone, which triggers the pro-
duction of dopamine, a hormone related to reward-seeking, i.e. of another positive
round-trip in this context. This motivates the trader to repeat or increase his plea-
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sure by taking additional risk. At relatively small doses, this exposure to reward
and reward-seeking has a positive effect. However, quite clearly, it corresponds to
a destabilizing feedback loop and certainly reinforces speculative bubbles. Accord-
ingly, the trading performance of investors is linked to their dopamine level, which
is partly determined by genes (Lo et al. [2005], Sapra et al. [2012]). .
Quite remarkably, the way various brain areas are activated during the successive
phases of speculative bubbles has been investigated in detail. Lohrenz et al. [2007]
suggest a neurological mechanism which motivates investors to try to ride a bubble:
they correlate the activity of a brain area with how much gain opportunities a trader
has missed since the start of a bubble. This triggers the production of dopamine,
which in turn triggers risk taking, and therefore generates trades. In other words,
regrets or “fear of missing out” lead to trend following.
After a while, dopamine, i.e., gut feelings, cannot sustain bubbles anymore as its
effect fades. Another cerebral region takes over; quite ironically, it is one of the more
rational ones: DeMartino et al. [2013] find a correlation between the activation level
of an area known to compute a representation of the mental state of other people,
and the propensity to invest in a pre-existing bubble. These authors conclude that
investors make up a rational explanation about the existence of the bubble (“others
cannot be wrong”) which justifies to further invest in the bubble. This is yet another
neurological explanation of our human propensity to trend following.
3.5 Conclusion
Many theoretical arguments suggest that volatility bursts may be intimately related
to the quasi-efficiency of financial markets, in the sense that predicting them is hard
because the signal-to-noise ratio is very small (which does not imply that the prices
are close to their “fundamental” values). Since the adaptive behaviour of investors
tends to remove price predictability, which is the signal that traders try to learn, price
dynamics becomes unstable as they then base their trading decision on noise only
(Challet et al. [2005], Patzelt and Pawelzik [2011]). This is a purely endogenous
phenomenon whose origin is the implicit or explicit learning of the value of trad-
ing strategies, i.e., of the interaction between the strategies that investors use. This
explains why these stylized facts have existed for at least as long as financial histor-
ical data exists. Before computers, traders used their strategies in the best way they
could. Granted, they certainly could exploit less of the signal-to-noise ratio than we
can today. This however does not matter at all: efficiency is only defined with re-
spect to the set of strategies one has in one’s bag. As time went on, the computational
power increased tremendously, with the same result: unstable prices and bursts of
volatility. This is why, unless exchange rules are dramatically changed, there is no
reason to expect financial markets will behave any differently in the future.
Similarly, the way human beings learn also explains why speculative bubbles
do not need rumour spreading on internet and social networks in order to exist.
Looking at the chart of an asset price is enough for many investors to reach similar
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(and hasty) conclusions without the need for peer-to-peer communication devices
(phones, emails, etc.). In short, the fear of missing out is a kind of indirect social
contagion.
Human brains have most probably changed very little for the last two thousand
years. This means that the neurological mechanisms responsible for the propensity
to invest in bubbles are likely to influence the behaviour of human investors for as
long as they will be allowed to trade.
From a scientific point of view, the persistence of all the above mechanisms jus-
tifies the quest for the fundamental mechanisms of market dynamics. We believe
that the above summary provides a coherent picture of how financial markets have
worked for at least two centuries (Reinhart and Rogoff [2009]) and why they will
probably continue to stutter in the future.
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